PROFESSOR VIVEK SANKARAN UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL CHILD ADVOCACY LAW CLINIC

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Introduction¹

In *Lassiter v. Department of Social Services*, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not automatically confer the right to counsel to indigent parents facing the termination of their parental rights. *Id.* at 31-32. Instead, the Court determined that trial courts had the responsibility of determining, on a case by case basis, whether the facts of the particular case created a federal constitution right to counsel. *Id.* The Court, however, did note that "a wise public policy . . . may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution" and that "[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well." *Id.* at 33-34.

Since the *Lassiter* decision, states have responded to the provision of legal counsel to indigent parents in various ways. This survey is an attempt to begin to capture the current state of a parent's right to counsel across the country in proceedings where the state is the adverse party (**this survey does <u>not</u> address privately-initiated dependency or termination/adoption proceedings**). As the survey documents, in 40 states plus D.C., parents have an absolute and unqualified statutory right to counsel after the state's initiation of child protection proceedings against them, in another 4 states the right is qualified in some way, in 5 states it is left to the judge's discretion, and in 1 state there is no provision for appointment of counsel. In 45 states plus D.C., parents have an absolute statutory right to counsel in state-initiated termination of parental rights hearings, while in the remaining 5 states it is left to the judge's discretion or there is only a right in certain circumstances. In a number of states, the right is both statutory and constitutional. However, in states where the right is solely statutory, the absence of constitutional protection has affected the availability of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, *see, e.g., In re N.D.O.*, 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005), and the standard of appellate review when counsel has been erroneously denied. *See, e.g., In re McBride*, 2008 Mich. App. LEXIS 1458 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).

This survey is just the first step in documenting the inadequacies in the legal services provided to indigent parents. Even in states in which a strong statutory right exists, many problems exist as it relates to attorney compensation, training requirements, waiver, and the timing of appointments, among other issues.² In a number of jurisdictions, practice varies by county. These and other issues affecting parent representation must be explored.³ Without quality representation for parents, there is a high likelihood that erroneous decisions will be made on crucial issues affecting families.

¹ John Pollock would like to thank Jeannie Rose Field, who volunteered her time to help him double-check the information in this chart.

² See, e.g., ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS: A PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN PRACTICE (2009) available at http://www.abanet.org/child/parentrepresentation/for Parents in Child Welfare Proceedings: A Performance-Based Analysis of Michigan Practice (2009) available at http://www.abanet.org/child/parentrepresentation/michigan_parent_representation_report.pdf.

³ The ABA has initiated a national project to improve the representation of parents in the child welfare system. More information about the project can be found at <u>http://www.abanet.org/child/parentrepresentation/home.html</u>.

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
<u>Alabama</u>	Dependency	Unclear. Morgan v. Lauderdale County Dept. of Pensions & Sec., 494 So. 2d 649, 651 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (finding no right, but unclear as to whether state or federal constitution was being addressed).		Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. K.P.B. v. D.C.A., 685 So.2d 750 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (construing <i>Ex parte</i> <i>Shuttleworth</i> , 410 So.2d 896 (Ala. 1981), as case interpreting state constitution and therefore unaffected by <i>Lassiter</i>).	Ala. Code § 12-15- 305(b)	Yes.	
<u>Alaska</u>	Dependency	Maybe. Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979) (finding right to counsel in private custody proceeding where opponent represented by state-funded legal aid, and quoting with approval language from <i>Cleaver v</i> . <i>Wilcox</i> , 499 F.2d 940 (9 th	12	Yes.	

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	-		Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		Cir. 1974) (Cal), a			
		dependency proceeding,			
		which held that due process			
		requires state to appoint			
		counsel whenever parent			
		"faces a substantial			
		possibility of the loss of			
		custody or of prolonged			
		separation from a child.")			
	Termination	Yes. V.F. v. State, 666 P.2d	AK R CINA Rule	Yes.	
		42 (Alaska 1983).	12; AS §		
			25.23.180(h)		
Arizona	Dependency	Possibly. AZ State Dept of	A.R.S. § 8-221(B)	Probably . Previously, A.R.S.	
		<i>PW v Barlow,</i> 296 P.2d 298		§ 8-225(B) provided a clear	
		(Ariz. 1956) (finding right to		right to counsel. But it was	
		retained counsel); In re Pima		recodified as A.R.S. § 8-	
		County Juvenile Action J-		221(B), and in 2010 the	
		64016, 619 P.2d 1073, 1075		language was changed to say	
		(Ariz. App. 1980) (relying		the court shall appoint counsel	
		on <i>Barlow</i> to find due		in situations when the parent is	
		process right in dependency).		"entitled to counsel".	
				However, in Daniel Y. v.	
				Arizona Dept. of Economic	
				Sec., 77 P.3d 55, 58 (Ariz.	
				App. 2003), the court said that	
				§ 8-221 provides an absolute	

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			Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
				right to counsel in dependency	
				proceedings.	
	Termination	Yes. AZ State Dept of PWv	A.R.S. § 8-221(B).	Yes. Although the statute	
		Barlow, 296 P.2d 298 (Ariz.		states that the court shall	
		1956) (not specifying which		appoint counsel "if a juvenile,	
		constitution it relied upon);		parent or guardian is found to	
		Denise H. v. Arizona Dept.		be indigent and entitled to	
		of Economic Sec., 972 P.2d		counsel," and although it does	
		241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998)		not define "entitled to counsel",	
		(saying that "[a]n indigent		cases construe the statute as	
		parent against whom a		actually entitling parents to	
		petition has been filed has		counsel. See, e.g., Christy A. v.	
		the right to appointed		AZ Dept. of Economic Sec.,	
		counsel, but that right is		173 P.3d 463 (Ariz. Ct. App.	
		afforded by statute and		2007) ("For termination	
		the due process clause",		adjudication hearings, indigent	
		and citing to <i>Barlow</i>).		parents have a right to	
				appointed counsel pursuant to	
				A.R.S. § 8-221(B) ").	

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<u>Arkansas</u>	Dependency	Case-by-case. Bearden v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 42 S.W.3d 397 (Ark. 2001) (but unclear if court was addressing state constitution).	A.C.A. § 9-27- 316(h)	Yes.	
	Termination	Case-by-case. Bearden v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 42 S.W.3d 397 (Ark. 2001) (but unclear if court was addressing state constitution).	A.C.A § 9-27- 316(h)	Yes.	
<u>California</u>	Dependency	/	(b)	Qualified: right attaches if state seeks out-of-home placement.	According to Joanne Brown, JD., MSW National Child Welfare Resource Center on Legal and Judicial Issues, ABA Center on Children and the Law, counsel is always appointed when a petition is filed.

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		proceeding").			
	Termination	Unclear. Compare <i>In re</i> <i>Christina P.</i> , 220 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1985) (finding no right), with <i>In re Jay</i> , 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding right).	Cal. Fam. Code § 7862; Cal Wel. & Inst. Code § 366.26(f)	Yes.	
<u>Colorado</u>	Dependency	No case on point.	C.R.S. § 19-3-202	Yes.	
	Termination	Case-by-case. C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2004) (but unclear if court was addressing state constitution).	C.R.S. § 19-3-602	Yes.	
Connecticut	Dependency	No case on point.	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-135(b)	Yes.	
	Termination	Unknown. In re Jonathan M., 764 A.2d 739 (Conn. 2001) (court says in dicta that there is not automatic due process right to counsel, but notes that petitioner did not argue for separate state	Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-717(b)	Yes.	

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<u>Delaware</u>	Dependency	Case-by-case. Watson v. DFS, 813 A.2d 1101 (Del. 2002).	De. R. Fam. Ct. RCP 206	No, the court may appoint. Until 2015, the rule required appointment. See <i>Hughes v.</i> <i>Division of Family Services</i> , 836 A.2d 498, 509 (Del. Supr. 2003). But 2015 amendment requires court to consider <i>Lassiter</i> factors.	
	Termination	Case-by-case. Matter of Carolyn S.S.,498 A.2d 1095 (Del. Supr. 1984); but see Brown v. Division of Fam. Servs., 803 A.2d 948 (Del. 2002) (suggesting court may overturn In re Carolyn S.S. and find Delaware Constitution mandates appointment of counsel in TPR if the issue is presented in a future case, "if the Family Court ever declines to appoint counsel for an indigent parent in a		No, the court may appoint. TPR is just a stage of the dependency proceeding. See <i>Brown v. Division of Family</i> <i>Services</i> , 803 A.2d 948 (Del. Supr. 2002). 2015 amendment to Rule 206 requires court to consider <i>Lassiter</i> factors.	

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District of Columbia	Dependency	No case on point.	D.C. Code § 16- 2304(b)(1); D.C. SCR-Neglect & Abuse Rule 42(a)	Yes.	
	Termination	No case on point.	D.C. Code § 16- 2304(b)(1)	Yes.	
<u>Florida</u>	Dependency	Yes, but only if dependency proceedings could lead to criminal abuse charges. In the Interest of D.B. and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); S.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam., 851 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 2003).	39.013(1)	Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. <i>In re J.B.</i> , 170 So. 3d 780, 789-790 (Fla. 2015)	Fla. Stat. § 39.807	Yes.	
Georgia	Dependency	No. In the Interest of A.M.R., 495 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. C. App. 1998) (not a dependency case, but states that while statutes provide for a right to counsel "at all stages of any	160	Yes.	

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			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		[termination] proceedings",	<u>mccnunism</u>		
		no constitutional rights are			
		involved.)			
	Termination	No. In the Interest of A.M.R.,	OCGA 8 15-11-	Ves	
	i en innation	495 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. C. App.		105.	
		1998).	_0_		
Hawaii	Dependency	Yes. In re T.M., 319 P.3d	HI ST § 587A-	Yes. The statute says the court	
	1 5	338 (Haw. 2014).	17(a)	"may appoint an attorney".	
				However, counsel is	
				constitutionally required.	
	Termination	Yes. In re T.M., 319 P.3d	HI ST § 587A-	Yes. The statute says the court	
		338 (Haw. 2014)	17(a)	"may appoint an attorney".	
				However, counsel is	
				constitutionally required.	
Idaho	Dependency	No case on point, but court	Id. R. Juv. Rule	Yes.	
		in Hughen v. Highland	37(d)		
		Estates, 48 P.3d 1238 (Idaho			
		2002) made it fairly clear			
		that <i>Lassiter</i> applies to all			
		civil cases in Idaho.			
	Termination	Unknown. State v. Doe, 850	I.C. § 16-2009	Yes.	
		P.2d 211 (Idaho Ct. App			
		1993) ("The question of			
		what due process protections			
		apply in a proceeding to			
		terminate a parent's right to			

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Singe	State Due Frocess Kight ?		<u>ripp i Kequireu:</u>	the Ground?
				ine Grouna:
	the control of the	mecnunism		
Dependency	• •	705 IL CS 405/1-	Vas	
Dependency	rto case on point.		103.	
		5(1)		
Termination	Unknown. In re K.L.P. v.	705 ILCS 405/1-	Yes.	
	<i>R.P.</i> , 763 N.E.2d 741 (III.	5(1)		
	requirements).			
Dependency	No, at least under federal	Ind. Code § 31-34-	Yes.	
	constitution. In re LB, 889	4-6		
	N.E.2d 326 (Ind. App. 2008)			
	(only addressing federal			
	constitution); EP v Marion			
	County, 653 N.E.2d 1026			
	(Ind. App. 1995) (same); In			
	<i>re MM</i> , 733 N.E.2d 6 (Ind.			
	App. 2000) (same).			
Termination	Unknown. Keen v. Marion	Ind. Code § 31-32-	Yes.	
	County Dep't of Pub.	4-3		
	Welfare, 523 N.E.2d			
	452 (Ind. App 1988)			
	(addressing only federal			
	constitution).			
		the control of the children has been addressed in Idaho by statute.") Dependency No case on point. Termination Unknown. In re K.L.P. v. R.P., 763 N.E.2d 741 (III. 2002) (addressing only federal due process requirements). Dependency No, at least under federal constitution. In re LB, 889 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. App. 2008) (only addressing federal constitution); EP v Marion County, 653 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1995) (same); In re MM, 733 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 2000) (same). Termination Unknown. Keen v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 523 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. App 1988) (addressing only federal	Based Appointment Mechanism Mechanism the control of the children has been addressed in Idaho by statute.") 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) Dependency No case on point. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) Termination Unknown. In re K.L.P. v. R.P., 763 N.E.2d 741 (III. 2002) (addressing only federal due process requirements). 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) Dependency No, at least under federal constitution. In re LB, 889 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. App. 2008) (only addressing federal constitution); EP v Marion County, 653 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1995) (same); In re MM, 733 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 2000) (same). Ind. Code § 31-32-County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 523 N.E.2d 4-3 Termination Unknown. Keen v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 523 N.E.2d 4-3 Ind. Code § 31-32-4-3	Based Appointment Mechanism Mechanism the control of the children has been addressed in Idaho by statute.") Mechanism Dependency No case on point. 705 ILCS 405/1- 5(1) Yes. Termination Unknown. In re K.L.P. v. R.P., 763 N.E.2d 741 (III. 2002) (addressing only federal due process requirements). 705 ILCS 405/1- 5(1) Yes. Dependency No, at least under federal constitution. In re LB, 889 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. App. 2008) (only addressing federal constitution); EP v Marion County, 653 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1995) (same); In re MM, 733 N.E.2d 6 (Ind. App. 2000) (same). Ind. Code § 31-32- 4-3 Yes. Termination Unknown. Keen v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 523 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. App 1988) (addressing only federal Ind. Code § 31-32- 4-3

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<u>Iowa</u>	Dependency	No case on point.	Iowa Code § 232.89(1)	Yes.	
	Termination	Unknown. <i>In re EJC</i> , 731 N.W.2d 402 (Iowa App. 2007) (addressing only federal constitution).	Iowa Code § 232.113	Yes.	
Kansas	Dependency	Case-by-case test. <i>In re</i> <i>Cooper</i> , 631 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1981).	Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2205(b)	Yes.	
	Termination	Unclear, but probably case-by-case. In re Cooper, 631 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1981) (holding 1 month after <i>Lassiter</i> decision that RTC exists whenever parent, "unable to present his or her case properly, faces a substantial possibility of loss of custody and permanent severance of parental rights of or prolonged separation from the child", but citing to 9th Circuit precedent that found categorical right to counsel).		Yes.	

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Kentucky	Dependency	No case on point.		Qualified: right attaches where, after a temporary removal hearing, the judge determines that further proceedings are required.	
	Termination	Unknown. A.P. v Com., 270 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (noting legislature passed statute, obviating need for constitutional analysis)	KRS 625.080(3)	Yes.	
Louisiana	Dependency	No. Compare In Interest of Howard, 382 So.2d 194 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (2 nd Circuit) (finding constitutional right to counsel) with State in Interest of C.V. v. T.V., 499 So.2d 159 (La. App. 1986) (2nd Circuit) (suggesting tha 2nd Circuit has likely switched to case-by-case approach). See also In re Driscoll, 410 So. 2d 255, 257-58 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (4 th Circuit) (disagreeing with Howard, taking case-	La. Ch.C. Art. 608 t	Yes.	

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			Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
		by-case approach, and noting	,		
		recent Lassiter decision).			
	Termination		La. Ch. C Art 1016	Yes.	
		of Johnson, 475 So.2d 340			
		(La. 1985) (applying <i>Lassiter</i>			
		to find right to counsel in			
		instant case, but not			
		addressing state			
		constitution).			
Maine	Dependency	Yes . Danforth v State Dept,		Yes, "except a request for a	
		303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In	4005(2)	preliminary protection order	
		<i>re T.B.</i> , 65 A.3d 1282,		under section 4034 or a	
		1285 (Me. 2013).		petition for a medical	
				treatment order under	
				section 4071, but including	
				hearings on those orders."	
	Termination	Yes. In re Kafia M., 742	Me. Rev. Stat. Ann	Yes.	
		A.2d 919, 927 n.5 (Me.	tit. 22, § 4005(2)		
		1999), cites Danforth v State			
		Dept, 303 A.2d 794 (Me.	counsel in child		
		1973) with approval as a	protection		
		case that established a due	proceedings); In re		
		process right to counsel in	Kafia M., 742 A.2d		
		, e	919, 927 n.5 (Me.		
		Kafia was ostensibly about	1999) (interpreting		

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Siule	Singe	Suite Due Process Right :	Based	<i>hpp i Keyuireu:</i>	the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		abuse/neglect. See also In	§ 4005(2) to		
		<i>re T.B.</i> , 65 A.3d 1282,	require appt of		
		1285 (Me. 2013)	counsel in TPR		
		1203 (1410. 2013)	proceedings)		
Maryland	Dependency	No case on point.	· · · · ·	Yes.	
		-	and Judicial		
			Proceedings, § 3-		
			813		
	Termination	Unanswered. In re Alijah	Md. Crim. Proc. §	Yes.	
		<i>Q</i> ., 7 A.3d 106 (Md. App.	16-204(b)(1)(vi)		
		2010) (noting Lassiter			
		suggested "wise policy"			
		might lead to broader			
		protection of rights by states,			
		and pointing to Maryland			
		statutory enactment of RTC).			
Massachusetts	Dependency	Yes. Guardianship of V.V.,	M.G.L.A. 119 § 29	Yes.	
		No. 11739 (Mass. 2015).	In re Hilary, 880		
			N.E.2d 343, 345,		
			346 (Mass. 2008)		
			(applying § 29 to		
			dependency).		
	Termination	Yes. In re Hilary, 880	M.G.L.A. 119 § 29	Yes.	
		N.E.2d 343, 348 n.13 (Mass.			
		2008)			

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			Mechanism		
Michigan	Dependency	No. <i>In re Perry</i> , 385 N.W.2d		Yes.	
		287 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)	MCL 712A.17c(4)		
	Termination	Unclear. In re Trowbridge, 401 N.W.2d 65 (1986) (relying on <i>Reist v. Bay</i>	MCR 3.977(I)(1); MCR. 3.915(B);	Yes.	
		<i>Circuit Judge</i> , 241 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. 1976), which	MCL §712A.17c		
		found state constitutional			
		right but which was			
		nonbinding plurality decision)			
<u>Minnesota</u>	Dependency	No. In re Welfare of S.A.W.,			According to Judith Nord, Staff
		2009 WL 2998116 (Minn. App. 2009)	260C.163 subdiv. (3)(b)	260C.163 subdiv. (3)(b) specifies that "The court shall	Attorney and Manager, Children's
		(hpp. 2007)	(5)(6)		Administrator's Office-Court Services
					Division, courts will typically appoint
				any case in which it feels that	
				such an appointment is appropriate".	custodial parents.
	Termination	No case on point. In re	Minn. Stat. §	Qualified (see above).	According to Judith Nord, Staff
		Welfare of Children of	260C.163 subdiv.		Attorney and Manager, Children's
			3(b); Minn. Stat. § 260C.176 subdiv.		Justice Initiative, State Court Administrator's Office-Court Services
		(Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (unpublished) (noting	3(7) 300.176 subdiv.		Division, both custodial and
		<i>Lassiter</i> found no right to			noncustodial parents who are parties

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
		counsel and that Minnesota had chosen to pass statutory right, but not exploring issue further).			are typically appointed counsel. See also <i>In re Welfare of J.B.</i> , 782 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 2010) (citing to § 260C.163 for proposition that "Minnesota law guarantees the right of parties to be represented by counsel in juvenile protection proceedings" (emphasis added)
<u>Mississippi</u>	Dependency	No case on point.	Miss. Code §§ 43- 21-201(2)	No.	Discretionary appointment statute was just passed in 2016. It has no funding attached to it.
	Termination	No. J.C.N.F. v. Stone County Dep't of Human Servs., 996 So.2d 762 (Miss. 2008); Blakeney v. McRee, 188 So. 3d 1154 (Miss. 2016)	Miss. Code 93-15- 113(b)	No.	Discretionary appointment statute was just passed in 2016. It has no funding attached to it.
<u>Missouri</u>	Dependency	No case on point.	V.A.M.S. 211.211(4)	No. Only appoint if indigent, request made, and court determines that "a full and fair hearing requires appointment of counsel for the custodian."	According to Lori-Burns-Bucklew, Of Counsel, Pro Bono Program, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, MO, counsel is commonly appointed, but not in every circuit.
	Termination	Unknown. In the interest of B.L.E. v. Elmore, 723 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (addressing only	V.A.M.S. 211.462(2)	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
Mantana	Den en den ere	S.W.2d 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (same).	NA4 S4 8 41 2 425	Vez	
<u>Montana</u>	Dependency	Case-by-case. In re A.FC., 37 P.3d 724, 730 (Mont. 2001) (decision of whether to appoint counsel "must be determined in view of all of the circumstances").	Mt. St. § 41-3-425	Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. <i>In re A.S.A</i> , 852 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1993).	Mt. St. § 41-3-425	Yes.	
<u>Nebraska</u>	Dependency	(Neb. 1991) (while due process mandates counsel in TPR hearings, it is decided on a case by case basis in other situations, such as dependency).	279.01	Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. In re Interest of R.R.,	Ne. Stat. § 43- 279.01	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	<u>Statutory/Rule-</u> Based Appointment Mechanism	<u>App't Required?</u>	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
<u>Nevada</u>	Dependency	No. Kidwell v. Department of Human Resources, 953 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1999), overruled on other grounds, In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126 (Nev. 2000).	Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 432B.420(1)	No. The court "may appoint".	According to Kathy O'Leary, Chief Deputy Public Defender for Washoe County, Washoe County is one of the two largest counties in the state, and counsel is appointed in over 95% of cases in that county after the 72-hour protective custody hearing.
	Termination	No. Letesheia O. v. State (In re N.D.O.), 115 P.3d 223 (Nev. 2005).	Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 128.100(2)	No. The court "may appoint".	According to Kathy O'Leary, Chief Deputy Public Defender for Washoe County, Washoe County is one of the two largest counties in the state, and counsel is appointed regularly in these proceedings.
New Hampshire	Dependency	Case-by-case. <i>In re C.M.</i> , 48 A.3d 942 (N.H. 2012). It is worth noting, though, that <i>C.M.</i> is a plurality opinion, so this issue could be revisited.		Yes.	
	Termination	No case on point.	N.H. Rev. Stat. § 170-C:10	Yes.	
New Jersey	Dependency	Yes. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Services v. E.B., 644 A.2d 1093 (N.J. 1994).	N.J. Stat. 9:6-8.43	Yes. Despite the fact that the statute says the litigant "may apply for an attorney through the Office of the Public	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
			<u>Appointment</u> Mechanism		
				Defender" (as opposed to the TPR statute that says the court "shall appoint" the PD), there is no significance to this language difference and there is a right to counsel in dependency, according to James Lewis of the New Jersey PD's Office.	
	Termination	Yes. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Svcs. v. B.R., 929 A.2d 1034 (N.J. 2007).	N.J. Stat. § 30:4C- 15.4 (if parent indigent and requests counsel, "the court shall appoint the Office of the Public Defender to represent the parent.")	Yes.	
<u>New Mexico</u>	Dependency	Unknown. State of N.M. ex rel. CYFD v. Amanda M., 144 P.3d 137 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (noting the right to counsel/effective assistance of counsel as statutory and declining to address whether	Rule 10-314;	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule-	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
			Based		the Ground?
			<u>Appointment</u>		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
		the right to effective			
		assistance of counsel is also			
		constitutionally protected).			
	Termination	Unknown. State of N.M. ex	NMSA 1978, §	Yes.	
		rel. CYFD v. Amanda M.,	32A-5-16(E);		
		144 P.3d 137 (N.M. Ct. App.	N.M. Children's Ct.		
		2006) (noting the right as	Rule 10-314.		
		statutory); see also State ex			
		rel. Children, Youth &			
		Families Dept. v. Tammy S.,			
		126 N.M. 664 (N.M. Ct.			
		App. 1998); Matter of			
		Termination of Parental			
		Rights of James W.H., 115			
		N.M. 256 (N.M. Ct. Ap.			
		1993) (noting the statutory			
		right to counsel but drawing			
		on constitutional concerns to			
		determine whether counsel			
		was effective).			
New York	Dependency	Yes. In re Ella B., 285	McKinney's Family	Yes.	
		N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972)	Court Act §		
		(relying on both state and	262(a)(4)		
		federal constitutional			
		grounds); In re Evan F., 815			
		N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App.			
		μι. τ . 5.2 α 077 (τι. τ. πρρ.	1		

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ? Div. 2006) (relying on Ella B).	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
	Termination	Probably. In re Ella B., 285 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972) (relying on both state and federal constitutional grounds; involved dependency but court says that "an indigent parent, faced with the loss of a child's society is entitled to the assistance of counsel"); In re Meko M., 272 A.D.2d 953, 954 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (stating that "A parent facing removal of a child from his or her home has a fundamental right to an attorney", and citing to In re Ella B)	McKinney's Family Court Act § 262	Yes.	
North Carolina	Dependency	Unknown. <i>In re Bikman</i> , 587 S.E.2d 681 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) ("As parents thus have a statutory right to	N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-602(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A-451(a)(12)	Yes.	

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			Based		the Ground?
			<u>Appointment</u>		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
		counsel in juvenile abuse,			
		neglect, and dependency			
		cases under North Carolina			
		law, the constitutional			
		analysis relied on in the			
		briefs of petitioner and the			
		guardian ad litem for			
		respondent's children is of no			
		consequence to the outcome			
		of this case.")			
	Termination	Case-by-case. In re Clark,	N.C. Gen. Stat. §	Yes.	
		281 S.E. 2d 47 (N.C. 1981)	7B-1101.1; N.C.		
		(prior statute not requiring	Gen. Stat. Ann. §		
		appointment of counsel did	7A-451(a)(15)		
		not violate state constitution;	(11 101(u)(10)		
		cases decided before			
		statutory right to counsel in			
		effect must be decided on			
		case by case basis, using			
		fundamental fairness test).			
North Dakota	Dependency	No case on point.	N.D. Cent. Code §	Yes, but no right at the	
	Dependency		27-20-26(1)	"informal adjustment" phase	
			27-20-20(1)		
	Termination	No case on point. In re	N.D. Cent. Code, §	Yes.	
		Adoption of K.A.S., 499	27-20-45(5); N.D.		
		N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993)	Cent. Code § 27-		
L		μ	Cont. Code § 27-		

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
		(noting that the state due process clause is often broader than the federal provision but declining to decide whether it is in this instance, since court found equal protection violation).	20-26		
<u>Ohio</u>	Dependency	No. <i>In re Miller</i> , 465 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1984).	RC § 2151.352; OH ST JUV P. Rule 4	Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.2d 66 (Ohio 1980) (based on both due process and equal protection); In re Walling, 2005 WL 736665 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished) (citing Heller); In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ohio 1985) (stating that "[T]his court has held that the state must appoint counsel for indigent parents at parental termination	Rule 4	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>		Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
Oklahoma	Dependency	Unclear. Compare Matter of FKC, 609 P.2d 774 (1980) (finding right to counsel in "dependency and neglect proceedings" based on prior holding in In re Chad S., 580 P.2d 983, 984-985 (Okla. 1978)) with Matter of Delaney, 617 P.2d 886 (Okla. 1980) (finding no right to counsel for "deprived-status proceedings").	§ 1-4-306(A)(1)(a); 10 Okl. St. Ann. § 24(A)(1)	Yes.	
	Termination	Yes. <i>In re D.D.F.</i> , 801 P.2d 703 (Okla. 1990).	10A Okl. St. Ann. § 1-4-306(A)(1)(a); 10 Okl. St. Ann. §24(A)(1). See also <i>Matter of</i> <i>Chad S.</i> , 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978) (interpreting 10 Okl. St. Ann. § 24 and statute later	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule-	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
			Based		the Ground?
			<u>Appointment</u> Maakaminn		
			Mechanism		
			renumbered as 10A		
			Okl. St. Ann. § 1-4-		
			306 as requiring		
			counsel to be		
			appointed in a		
			termination		
Oragan	Danandanay	Casa hy assa hasia Stata ay	proceeding)).	No. Councel appointed	According to the Office of Dublic
Oregon	Dependency	Case by case basis. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of	419B.205(1)	No . Counsel appointed "whenever the nature of the	According to the Office of Public Defense Services in Salem, OR,
		Multnomah County v.	419D.203(1)		counsel is routinely appointed in
		Grannis, 680 P.2d 660 (Or.		require In deciding whether	
		1984) (discussing factors to		to appoint counsel under this	dependency proceedings.
		consider and how they differ		section, the court shall consider	
		between termination and		the following factors: (a) The	
		dependency case).		duration and degree of	
		dependency case).		invasiveness of the interference	
				with the parent-child	
				relationship that possibly could	
				result from the proceeding; (b)	
				The complexity of the issues	
				and evidence; (c) The nature of	
				allegations and evidence	
				contested by the parent or legal	
				guardian; and (d) The effect the	
				facts found or the disposition in	
				the proceeding may have on	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>		<u>Statutory/Rule-</u>	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Crease d?
			Based		the Ground?
			<u>Appointment</u>		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
				later proceedings or events,	
				including but not limited to	
				termination of parental rights	
				or criminal proceedings."	
	Termination	Case by case basis. State ex	ORS § 419B.518	Yes.	
		rel. Juvenile Dept. of			
		Multnomah County v. Geist,			
		796 P.2d 1193 (Or. 1990).			
Pennsylvania	Dependency	No case on point.	42 Pa CSA § 6337	Yes.	
•		-	Ŭ		
	Termination	Maybe. In re Adoption of	23 Pa CSA § 2313	Yes.	
		<i>R.I.</i> , 312 A.2d 601 (Pa.	(Adoption Act,		
		1973) stated there was such a	which is used for		
		right, but it preceded Lassiter	state-initiated TPRs	5	
		and has been cast into some	based on		
		doubt. See In re Adoption of	abuse/neglect); 42		
		<i>T.M.F</i> , 573 A.2d 1035, 1040			
		(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (Beck,	Ŭ		
		J., concurring) ("Lassiter has			
		undermined Adoption of R.I.,			
		at least insofar as Adoption			
		of R.I.'s broad right to			
		counsel holding was based			
		on the federal due process			
		clause. It is unclear,			
l		ciause. It is uncreat,			

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			Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
		however, whether Adoption			
		of R.I. was decided solely on			
		federal grounds"); Corra v.			
		<i>Coll</i> , 451 A.2d 480, 485 n.7			
		(Pa. Super. 1982) ("Although	L		
		the [<i>R</i> . <i>I</i> .] court based its			
		opinion on the due process			
		clause, and cited federal law,			
		it is unclear whether its final			
		disposition was on state or			
		federal grounds.") See also			
		In re Adoption of L.J.B., 995			
		A.2d 1182 (Pa. 2010)			
		(remanding to trial court to			
		determine if mother in TPR			
		case is "eligible" for			
		appointed counsel, and citing			
		<i>R.I.</i>)			
Rhode Island	Dependency	No case on point.	RI Gen. Laws §§	Yes. RI Gen. Laws 40-11-	
				7.1(b)(4) and RI R. Juv. P.	
				Rule 15, which govern ex parte	
			RI R. Juv. P. Rule	dependency hearings, say the	
			15(c)(4)	court shall appoint counsel for	
				such hearing. As to full	
				hearings, RI Gen. Laws 14-1-	
				31 (within the "Delinquent and	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	<u>Statutory/Rule-</u> Based Appointment Mechanism	<u>App't Required?</u>	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
			<u>11cenanism</u>	Dependent Children" chapter)	
				says parents are entitled to the	
				services of the PD. R.I. Gen.	
				Laws § 40-11-14 (within	
				"Abused and Neglected	
				Children") says the court "may	
				at the request of that person,	
				and in its discretion, appoint	
				the public defender, or other	
				council, to represent the	
				person." But this language	
				does not actually make the	
				appointment of counsel	
				discretionary: according to Jim	
				Queenan, Chief of the Parental	
				Rights Division of the Rhode	
				Island Public Defenders, the	
				"discretion" language was	
				added in an inartfully drafted	
				1982 amendment whose sole	
				purpose was to allow the court	
				to choose to appoint private	
				counsel instead of the public	
				defender, not to choose	
				whether to appoint at all.	

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<u>State</u>	Stage Termination	State Due Process Right ? No. In re Bryce T., 764 A.2d 718 (R.I. 2001) ("Despite the lack of a constitutional mandate", R.I. statutes, specifically Rule 18(c), provide for appointed counsel in TPR cases).		<u>App't Required?</u> Yes.	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
South Carolina	Dependency	No. Broom v. Jennifer J.,	S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1620(3)	Yes.	
	Termination			Yes.	

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State	Stage	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule-	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
Sille	Singe	Suite Due Frocess Kight ?	Based	прр і кецинеи:	the Ground?
			Appointment		ine Ground:
			Mechanism		
		appointment of counsel for	Mecnunism		
		indigents in all termination			
		•			
		of parental rights cases", but			
		cautioning that, under its			
		interpretation of <i>Lassiter</i> ,			
		"cases in which appointment			
		of counsel is not required			
G (1 D 1)		should be the exception").		x 7	
<u>South Dakota</u>	Dependency	1	S.D. Codified Laws	Yes.	
		People ex rel. S.D. Dep't of	§ 26-7A-31		
		Soc. Servs., 691 N.W.2d 586			
		(2004) (Gilbertson, C.J.,			
		concurring) (suggesting no			
		right to counsel exists except			
		where there is threat to			
		physical liberty).			
	Termination	No case on point. See note		Yes.	
		above relating to	§ 26-7A-31		
		dependency.			
Tennessee	Dependency	Unknown. State ex rel. T.H.	Tenn. Code § 37-1-	Yes.	
		<i>by H.H. v. Min</i> 802 S.W.2d	126(a)(2)(B); Tn.		
			Sup. Ct. Rule		
		(stating that "the United	13(d)(2)(B)		
		States Supreme Court's			
		decision in Lassiter still			
		represents the law in a case			

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	<u>Statutory/Rule-</u>	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
			Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			<u>Mechanism</u>		
		involving an indigent			
		parent's right to counsel in a			
		proceeding affecting parental			
		rights", suggesting decision			
		was only about federal			
		constitution).			
	Termination	Unclear. Lyon v King, 2008	Tenn. Code § 37-1-	Yes. In fact, the trial judge	
		WL 490657 (Tenn. Ct. App.	126(a)(2)(B); Tn.	presiding has an affirmative	
		2008) (unpublished) stated		duty to determine if a party	
		that "[t]he entitlement to		who appears unrepresented	
		appointed counsel in a		may be eligible for appointed	
		parental termination action is		counsel. See Lyon v. King.	
		controlled by the Due		2 0	
		Process Clause of the			
		Fourteenth Amendment to			
		the United States			
		Constitution and the			
		Tennessee Constitution", but			
		provided no authority for this			
		statement and went on to rely			
		upon the court rule.			
Texas	Dependency	No case on point.	Tex. Fam. Code §	Qualified: right is triggered	According to the Travis County Office
	2 openaeney	rie cuse on points	107.013(a), (b)	where state seeks temporary	of Parent Representation, while it is not
			10,1012(u), (0)	1 0	a prerequisite for dependency for the
				for child.	state to seek appointment of a
				ivi ciniu.	managing conservator, in practice the
					managing conservator, in practice the

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>		Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	<i>If Discretionary, What is Practice on</i> <i>the Ground?</i> state does so routinely in their county.
	Termination	Unknown, as cases only address federal constitution. In the Interest of J.R.P., 55 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App. 2001); Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex. App. 1986).	107.013(a), 161.003(d)	Yes, where termination suit filed by government entity.	
<u>Utah</u>	Dependency	No case on point.	Utah Code§ 78A-6- 1111(1)(c)	Yes.	
	Termination	Unknown. State ex rel. C.C. v. State, 48 P.3d 244 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) says only that parents in TPR cases do not have the "full panoply of rights" afforded criminal defendants, but does not specifically address the right to counsel.	6-1111(1)(c)	Yes.	
Vermont	Dependency	No case on point.	Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5306(d)(5) (emergency care order and	No. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 5306 specifies that counsel "may be court-appointed in the event the parent is eligible",	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	<u>Statutory/Rule-</u> <u>Based</u> Appointment Mechanism	<u>App't Required?</u>	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
			temporary care hearing); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5232(3) (petitions filed in juvenile court); VT R FAM P Rule 2(c); VT R FAM P Rule 3(a).	and Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5232 adds that the court shall appoint counsel when the "interests of justice so require.", Vt. R. Fam. P. Rule 2(c) specifies that "[c]ounsel shall be assigned at the temporary care hearing or prior to the preliminary hearing," but this is likely a reference to whatever counsel the court decides to appoint.	
	Termination	No case on point.	Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5232; <i>In re</i> <i>G.F.</i> , 923 A.2d 578 (Vt. 2007) (applying § 5232 to TPR proceeding)	No. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5232 says the court shall appoint counsel when the "interests of justice so require."	The Vermont Supreme Court has said, "Although in theory the appointment of counsel under § 5232(3) [] remains discretionary, in practice counsel are uniformly appointed to represent needy parents in termination proceedings from trial through appeal." <i>In re S.C.</i> , A.3d, 2014 WL 92238 (Vt. 2014). Notably, parents have a right to counsel in Adoption Act terminations, as per 15A V.S.A. § 3-201.
Virginia	Dependency	No case on point.	Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266(D); Va. Code 16.1-252(C)	Yes.	

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based Appointment Mechanism	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
	Termination	No case on point.	Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-266(D)	Yes.	
<u>Washington</u>	Dependency	Unclear. In re Welfare of Myricks, 533 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1975) was pre- Lassiter case, but post- Lassiter cases have suggested it may still be in force. See, e.g., King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 662 n.3 (Wash. 2007) ("While the federal due process underpinnings of [Luscier and Myricks] may have been	Wa. Stat. § 13.34.090(2); Wa. Stat. § 13.32A.160(1)(b) (out-of-home placement)	Yes.	

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State	Stage	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule-	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
Siule	Singe	State Due Frocess Right :	Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		eroded by [Lassiter], since			
		our holdings have been			
		legislatively codified we			
		need not address the			
		continuing validity of our			
		cases. We note that <i>Luscier</i>			
		and <i>Myricks</i> were favorably			
		cited more recently in our			
		case, In re Dependency of			
		Grove")			
	Termination	Unclear. In re Welfare of	Wa. St. §	Yes; in fact, "[t]he parents'	
		Luscier, 524 P.2d 906	13.34.090; In re	appearance triggers the court's	
		(Wash. 1974) was pre-		duty to provide counsel; no	
		Lassiter case, but post-	P.3d 1219	request for appointment of	
		Lassiter cases have	(Wash. App. 2003)	counsel is required." In re	
		suggested it may still be in	(applying §	Welfare of JM.	
		force. See dependency note	13.34.090 to TPR		
		above.	proceeding)		
		-			
West Virginia	Dependency	Probably. State ex rel.	W. Va. Code § 49-	Yes.	
		Lemaster v. Oakley, 203	4-601(f); W. Va.		
		S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974)	Code, § 29-21-2(2)		
		(finding right to counsel in			
		dependency); Matter of			
		Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110			
		(W.Va. 1995) (reaffirming			

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<u>State</u>	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule- Based	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		Lemaster at least with			
		respect to TPR and probably			
		for abuse/neglect as well).			
	Termination	Yes. State ex rel. Lemaster v.		Yes.	
			6-2(a); W. Va.		
			Code, § 29-21-2(2)		
		Lindsey C., 473 S.E.2d 110			
		(W.Va. 1995) (reaffirming			
		Lemaster with respect to			
		TPR).			
Wisconsin	Dependency	Case-by-case. Joni B. v.	No statute. See	No.	
		State, 549 N.W.2d 411 (Wis.			
			<i>Tammy L. D.</i> , 617		
			N.W.2d 894 (Wis.		
		894 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)	Ct. App. 2000)		
		("The message from <i>Joni B</i> .			
		is that the juvenile courts of			
		this state have the			
		discretionary authority on a			
		case-by-case basis to appoint			
		counsel for a parent in a			
		CHIPS case.")	W/: 04 4 88 40 22	× 7	
	Termination	•	Wis. Stat. §§ 48.23,	r es.	
		C. v. Tammy L. D., 617	48.42(3)(b)		
		N.W.2d 894 (Wis. Ct. App.			
		2000) (citing Piper v. Popp,			

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State	<u>Stage</u>	State Due Process Right ?	Statutory/Rule-	App't Required?	If Discretionary, What is Practice on
State	Suge	<u>State Due Process Rag</u> in (Based		the Ground?
			Appointment		
			Mechanism		
		482 N.W.2d 353 (Wis.			
		1992), as case that adopted			
		due process test devised in			
		Lassiter).			
Wyoming	Dependency	Unknown. In Interest of JL,	Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-	Yes.	
		761 P.2d 985, 992 n.11	422		
		(Wyo. 1988) (declining to			
		determine whether counsel			
		should have been appointed			
		for dependency stage			
		because issue had expired,			
		but describing law in other			
		states).			
	Termination	Unknown. In re CC, 102	Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-	No . The court "may appoint"	Because any appointed counsel is paid
		P.3d 890 (Wyo. 2004)	318	in a TPR proceeding.	for by the agency filing the TPR
		(applying only federal			petition (as per the statute), the PD's
		constitution).			office does not handle these cases, so
					there is no centralized place to check
					with as to how often counsel is
					appointed.