ADINOLFI & LIEBERMAN, P.A. 4 Kings Highway East Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033 Telephone No.: (856) 428-8334 Facsimile No.: (856) 428-8779 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

DEBRA NOVAK,

٦,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

KENNETH C. MORETZ, JR.,

Defendant-Respondent,

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO.: A-003021-11T3

CIVIL ACTION

ON APPEAL FROM:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVISION-FAMILY PART COUNTY OF BURLINGTON

SAT BELOW:

Marie White Bell, J.S.C. DOCKET NO: FV-03-876-12

BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Adinolfi and Lieberman, PA
Attorneys at Law
4 Kings Highway East
Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033
(856) 428-8334
FAX # (856) 428-8779
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

Ronald G. Lieberman, Esquire OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF

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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL STATEMENT

Plaintiff/Appellant, Debra Novak, and Defendant/Respondent, Kenneth Moretz, were an unmarried couple who lived together for years, had an 18-year relationship (T. 36:1-11), and had a child together, Alayna, age 12 (Pal). A custody order was entered on October 25, 2011 (Pa8-9) awarding joint legal custody of Alayna and directing Defendant to be the parent of primary residence with no set parenting time for Plaintiff pending counseling between Alayna and Plaintiff (T. 8:6-22; 54:17 to 55:18).

On December 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Domestic Violence Civil Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order against Defendant on the grounds of assault (Pal). A Final Restraining Order hearing was held on December 22, 2011. During that hearing, Plaintiff was pro se while Defendant was represented by counsel (T. 3:8-10).

The trial judge asked few questions of Plaintiff about whether she wanted an attorney (T. 3:11-22) and focused on the consequences of being found guilty of domestic violence (T. 3:23 to 4:25). The first time the trial judge asked Plaintiff about the consequences Plaintiff told the court of the fact that two

 $^{^{1}}$ The hearing was consolidated for both parties' cross-restraints under FV-03-864-12 and FV-03-876-12.

matters were pending and could not answer the question (T. 4:3-6). The second time Plaintiff was asked the question, Plaintiff stated that she would not be found guilty and could not answer the question (T. 4:15-19).

At no point did the trial judge inform Plaintiff of the her consequences of Temporary Restraining Order against Defendant being dissolved if the court did not find that an act of domestic violence occurred or that no protection warranted. What transpired during the hearing on December 22, 2011. made it clear that Plaintiff had not knowingly intelligently waived her right to counsel, and that hearing should have been recessed to allow her counsel.

The resulting transcript is a product of the failure of the trial court to recess that hearing to protect Plaintiff seeking the serious salutary effects of the entry of a Final Restraining Order against Defendant and the protections such an Order would provide to her. The transcript is tainted by the lack of due process afforded Plaintiff and the lack of any knowing and intelligent "waiver" of right to counsel in this matter. The hearing was permeated with the procedural deficiencies presented therein.

The trial court conducted the direct examination of Plaintiff about the incident in question by asking 13 questions

(T. 72:1 to 73:21). There were no questions posed by the trial court to Plaintiff about her fear of further abuse from or immediate danger of Defendant before the trial court announced "cross examination" (T. 73:22).

Without interruption by the trial court, Defendant's attorney did not let Plaintiff complete her answers to cross examination questions (T. 79:10-19).

During the cross examination, Plaintiff informed Defendant's attorney that "I don't understand what you're saying just like I didn't understand that day [during a prior court appearance]." (T. 80: 22-23). Plaintiff's testimony about not understanding the proceeding at that point was consistent with her prior testimony earlier that day when the trial court inquired of Plaintiff about an objection, and Plaintiff stated "I don't understand. Do - what? I could say you don't have to look at them? No...." (T. 20:6-8). Plaintiff pressed that "I don't understand. I don't understand." (T. 20:12-13).

When pressed by Defendant's counsel for answers, Plaintiff against mentioned that "I don't know what you're talking about." (T. 81:3-5).

The cross examination conducted by Defendant's attorney was replete with compound questions posed to Plaintiff, each of which was posed without interruption by the trial court (T.

77:14-15; 78:18-19; 79:1-3; 79:10-12; 79:14-19; 80:3-4; 80:8-9; 80:11-13; 80:15-19; 81:14-18; 82:17-20; 82:24-25; 83:20-24; 84:1-2; 84:8-9; 84:12-14; 86:7-8; 86:18-19; and 87:16-18).

Plaintiff asked Defendant's attorney to clarify some questions during the cross examination yet the trial court failed to direct a clarification of the questions posed to Plaintiff (83:12-19).

During a crucial point in the cross-examination when Defendant's attorney was questioning Plaintiff about Defendant's assault on her, Plaintiff and Defendant's attorney each spoke over the other (T. 85:3-20) leading an incomprehensible record of that exchange.

At other points, Defendant's attorney would not let Plaintiff answer the questions posed to her (T. 86:18-25) and mischaracterized her testimony (T. 87:24 to 88:4), however the trial court did not intervene.

When Defendant was questioned by his attorney about Plaintiff's domestic violence complaint, Defendant testified about hearsay statements regarding what his daughter allegedly said to him or what she did or did not do or what she had thought (T. 89:23 to 90:3; 90:22-25; 92:20-21; 95:2-4; 96:14-18; 97:7-10; 97:24 to 98:1) without intervention by the trial court. Defendant even testified about what a neighbor said to him about

Plaintiff (T. 96:19-23), again without the intervention of the trial court.

There were compound questions posed to Defendant by his attorney without the intervention of the trial court (T. 91:11-12; 92:4-6; 93:12-14).

There were leading questions from Defendant's attorney to Defendant on direct examination (T. 93:12 to 94:9; 94:13-15; 95:10-12; 96:12-13), all without intervention of the trial court. Those questions dealt with the underlying domestic violence allegation of Plaintiff.

Upon the conclusion of the direct examination of Defendant, and without asking Plaintiff if she wanted to cross-exam Defendant, the trial court ended the proceeding, in the middle of Plaintiff's sentence (T. 99:2-11).

Thereafter, in a seven-line statement, after noting that there was "a conflict in - in testimony with retard to what happened in the Walmart parking lot," the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's request for the entry of a final restraining order. (T. 99:5-11). Plaintiff's Temporary Restraining Order was dissolved (Pa7).

LEGAL ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's scope of review of a final restraining order issued by a trial court involves a determination of whether, giving due regard to the trial judge's credibility determinations and "feel for the case," sufficient evidence to support the factual findings exist. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). Where sufficient credible evidence was presented at the hearing to support the trial court's decision, the factual findings of the court are to be affirmed. Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).

It is well-established that this Court's review of a trial judge's conclusions of law is de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 278 (1995). When the decision of the trial court is made upon an interpretation of the law that is inconsistent with well-established law, the decision must be reversed. State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 604 (1990); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7 (1969).

In the present case, Plaintiff submits that the trial court erred as a matter of law in the following respect: (a) finding that Plaintiff failed to prove a predicate act of assault by a preponderance of the evidence; and (b) finding that Plaintiff failed to proved the need for protection in the form of a final

restraining order by a preponderance of the evidence.

Moreover, the trial court's conduct of the final hearing brings into sharp focus the need for this Court to determine once and for all that a plaintiff/victim in a domestic violence hearing is entitled to counsel paid by the taxpayers of the State of New Jersey and that firm, standardized guidelines need to be established for a trial court to follow before a victim can be considered to have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel at the final hearing in a domestic violence matter.

I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE TWO PRONGS OF SILVER V. SILVER.

The Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"], placed the burden of establishing the propriety of the issuance of a final restraining order upon the party applying for it. The enabling statutory legislation is found at N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) and sets forth six different factors at N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (a)(6) for a trial court to consider when ruling upon the entry of a final restraining order.

The task of the trial court, therefore, is two-pronged and as follows: "first, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in the definitional provisions of the Act has occurred; and second the trial court is to enter a final restraining order against the defendant only if the restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 127 (App. Div. 2006).

Thus, it was Plaintiff's burden to establish both elements by a preponderance of the evidence: first, a plaintiff must present sufficient credible proof that a "predicate act" as

defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19a has occurred. Once a plaintiff establishes a predicate act falling within the purview of the Act, the second, mandatory inquiry is whether a restraining order is "necessary" based upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (a)(6), "to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse."

Id. In the absence of sufficient proof of either element, a final restraining order may not issue. Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 400 (1998).

In the present case, and in contravention of <u>Silver</u>, <u>supra</u>, the trial court below did not cite let alone analyze any of the six specific factors under <u>N.J.S.A.</u> 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (a)(6). Instead, the trial court made a conclusory statement that Plaintiff had not established a predicate act of domestic violence. Out of a transcript that ran 103 pages, seven sentences in total were "dedicated" to ruling upon Plaintiff's request for the entry of a restraining order against Defendant (T. 99:5-11). The trial court appeared to tire of the matter and gave less than short shrift to Plaintiff's Civil Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order against Defendant (Pa 1-6).

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S "PRONG ONE" FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS DID NOT RISE TO THE LEVEL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

In the case before this Court, the allegation of Plaintiff was that Defendant committed the predicate act of assault in a parking lot of a Walmart by driving away while she was still located on his truck (T. 72:12 to 73:20).

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a, Simple Assault, reads that an actor commits an act of simple assault if he "(1) Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another...." Not much harm needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence and even a slap or stinging sensation is enough. N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1997). Bodily contact with a door if done intentionally by the defendant is simple assault. State v. Bazin, 912 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.J. 1995).

In the present case, the trial court did not focus on the facts and made little to no findings of fact on this matter. The trial court did not cite let alone analyze N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1a.

III. THE DISMISSAL OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS CLEARLY UNABLE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE HEARING AND SUPPLY EVIDENCE THAT WOULD LIKELY HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

This case brings into sharp focus the need for this Court to pick up where this Court left off in Crespo v. Crespo, 408 N.J. Super. 25, 45 (App. Div. 2009), aff'd 201 N.J. 207 (2010), and find that "the imposition of a restraining order of the scope authorized by the Act constitutes a matter of sufficient magnitude to warrant the appointment of counsel...." Domestic violence matters are a societal ill and warrant the maximum protections this state can offer. Domestic violence matters are of "sufficient magnitude" and importance to warrant the right to have counsel appointed.

This Court should also adopt clear and unequivocal guidelines for trial courts to follow when confronted with a plaintiff who seeks to proceed pro se and to waive his or her right to have an attorney. Such standardized guidelines must ensure that the integrity of the proceeding is upheld and that such a waiver of counsel by a putative victim is made knowingly and intelligently.

Unfortunately, there presently exists no formal or informal guidelines for such inquiry to be in a domestic violence matter.

Instead, the legal system has piecemeal, judge-by-judge

approaches that cannot protect the integrity of the system or the interests of the putative victims. So the guidelines currently in place for criminal proceedings for waiver of counsel should be adopted.

A. This Court Should Recognize A Right To Counsel For Victims In Domestic Violence Proceedings

This Court is well aware that the issuance of a final restraining order "has serious consequences to the personal and professional lives of those who are found guilty of what the legislature has characterized as a 'serious crime against society.'" Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005). This Court has held in Crespo, supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 15, that our state has "the strong societal interest in protecting persons victimized by domestic violence...."

With the enactment of the Act, the Legislature intended "to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Under the Act, which is remedial in nature, the primary focus is to provide immediate protection to the victim. Ibid. As the Supreme Court noted, "there is no such thing as an act of domestic violence that is not serious." Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 298 (1996).

The Supreme Court recognized how important an interest

society has in protecting victims of domestic violence:

Domestic violence is a serious problem in our society. Each year, three to four million women from all socioeconomic classes, races, and religions, are battered by husbands, partners, and boyfriends. The Act and its legislative history confirm that New Jersey has a strong policy against domestic violence. Although New Jersey is in the forefront of states that have sought to curb domestic violence, New Jersey police reported 77,680 incidents of domestic violence in 2000 alone. State v. Reyes, 172 N.J. 154, 163 (2002).

As the Supreme Court further held, the passage of the Act has not decreased the amount of reported domestic violence cases; instead "in spite of decades of careful and consistent enforcement of the Act by our courts, domestic violence remains a significant problem in our society... [with] reports of domestic violence [having] increased [in 2009]." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 474-475 (2011).

The concept that the public policy behind the Act was to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse that the law can provide was clearly acknowledged by the Supreme Court—in Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375 (2000). The intent of the Legislature through the Act is to recognize that "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence." State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997). That "solicitous" nature of treating victims was best revealed by the way that the Act has been amended over the years

to expand the nature of victims, grounds for relief, protections for victims, and encourage training and education for court personnel. See J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 473.

It has long been held by our courts that counsel is required where "consequences of magnitude" are at stake.

Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 (1971). Given the Legislative intent regarding domestic violence matters, it is now clear that victims should be afforded counsel.

The right to counsel should also be grounded in Article I,
Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution that provides:

All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. (Emphasis added.)

The "safety and happiness" of a victim is imbedded throughout the intent of the Legislature in the Act. It is a natural offshoot to find that the right to counsel to guide a victim through the process of "gathering documentary evidence, presenting testimony, [and] marshalling legal arguments...,"

Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127; 145 (2006) should be part of the "maximum protection" given to victims.

The Due Process guarantee of Article I, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution should be invoked and act as a bulwark

because of the nature of the right and public interest involved.

Given the findings by the Legislature, this Court, and the Supreme Court regarding the serious nature of domestic violence, the interests of victims in protection should be deemed fundamental and constitutionally protected by affording right to counsel. This need for counsel is especially true where as in the present case an indigent victim, unskilled in the law, was pitted against the knowledge and resources of counsel.

B. But For Plaintiff's Inability To Participate In The Hearing, The Final Restraining Order Likely Would Have Been Entered

Plaintiff testified that she explored the existence of a surveillance tape of the incident between her and Defendant, but that she could not get it from Walmart. (T. 87:3-25; 88:1-12). The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's temporary restraining order finding that there was "a conflict in - in testimony with regard to what happened in the Walmart parking lot." (T. 99:5-8) Moreover, the trial court found that Plaintiff did not supply "any evidence that she was injured or that she was struck by the side mirror or anything of that nature...." (T. 99:9-11). Had counsel been provided to Plaintiff, that tape may have been procured from Walmart to verify her allegations against Defendant regarding the commission of an assault and revealed

the "evidence" that the trial court said was lacking.

The proceedings were flawed because of the lack of an appointment of counsel for Plaintiff. The trial court permitted Defendant's counsel to question Defendant in a leading fashion on direct examination. "Leading questions should not be used on direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testimony." N.J.R.E. 611c.

The trial court permitted Defendant's counsel to question both parties with compound questions in violation of N.J.R.E.

102 regarding the development of "evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined,"

N.J.R.E. 403 causing "undue prejudice [or] confusion of issues," and N.J.R.E. 611a regarding "presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth...and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."

The trial court permitted Defendant's counsel to question Defendant repeatedly about verbal statements, beliefs, and non-verbal actions allegedly attributable to the parties' daughter without any exception being shown, in violation of N.J.R.E. 802 that states "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other law." Plaintiff did not know whether to raise such an objection, although it was warranted.

The trial court permitted Defendant's counsel to question Defendant about (a) what a court staffer allegedly said to him, (b) what the police allegedly said to him, (c) what a neighbor allegedly said to him, and (d) what a worker from the Division of Youth and Family Services allegedly said to him, each of which further violated N.J.R.E. 802.

The trial court permitted Defendant's counsel to question Plaintiff with misstatements of the evidence or distortion of the facts, which clearly are impermissible. Matthews v. Nelson, 57 N.J. Super. 515, 521 (App. Div. 1959), certif. den. 31 N.J. 296 (1960). It is arguable that counsel's action ran afoul of R.P.C. 3.4(e) regarding fairness during litigation.

The trial court's failure to allow Plaintiff to cross-exam Defendant on her allegations was a violation of her fundamental due process rights. Cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." State v.

Benitez, 360 N.J. Super. 101, 125 (App. Div. 2003) (dissent), quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The integrity of an adversarial proceeding is called into question when the right to confrontation is denied. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969).

Each error above, either separately or jointly, either in part or in whole, reveals that had Plaintiff been afforded

counsel, the December 22, 2011, would have had been a different procedural and substantive undertaking.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should Respectfully reverse the dismissal of Plaintiff's Temporary Restraining Order, re-instate it, and order a new hearing before a different judge.

Respectfully submitted, ADINOLFI & LIEBERMAN, P.A.

Bv:

RÓNALD G. LIEBERMAN

	PLAINT AND TEMPOPARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(V) TRO () AMENDED TRO N.J.S.A	
(X) Superior Court, Chancery Division, Fam	ily Part, Burlington County
() Municipal Court of	
Docket # <u>FV-03-000876-12-W</u> Poli	ce Case #
In the Matter of	* Plaintiff's
Plaintiff (Victim): NOVAK, DEBRA	* Sex F Date of birth 08/03/1969

D Name: MORETZ, KENNETH C	Sex M Date of birth 03/03/1970
	···
E AKA	Race CAUCASIAN Wt. 200 Ht. 5' 10'
F Home Address *** CONFIDENTIAL ***	17
E 30 Faybrooks Dr Marlton	/U)SSN ***-**-2867
N Work Address	
D -	Hair Color BROWN Bye Color BROWN
. A Other Marks, Scars	
	Warra Thank War (
	Home Phone No. () -
T***********************	
The undersigned complains that said defenda	ant did endanger plaintiff's life
health or well being (Give specific facts a	regarding acts, threats, abuse and the
date(s) and time(s) they occurred; Specify	
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STEALING A PHONE THAT	r may have been delivered to .
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	LLOWED HER AND TRIED TO GET HE?
which constitute(s) the following criminal	
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()Homicide ()Criminal Restraint	
(X) Assault () False Imprisonment	()Criminal Mischief ()Stalking \
()Terroristic Threats()Sexual Assault	()Burglary
	ontact ()Criminal Trespass
1. Any prior history of domestic violence r	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(X) YES () NO TO PULL OVER. BOTH PATIES	
PARKING LOT AND PARTIES SPOKE. PLA WAS ST	
ON THE EDGE OF DEF TRUCK WHEN HE PULLED A	WAY. PLA hit Side mirror trell off
2. Does defendant have a criminal history?	(If yes, attach CCH Summary)
()YES (X)NO	•
3. Any prior/pending court proceedings invo	Juing marties? (If was enter Docket #c
County, State) (X) YES () NO FV0386412,	
4. Has a Criminal Complaint been filed in t	his matter? (If yes, enter Docket #,
County, State) ()YES (X)NO	
5. If law enforcement officials responded t	o domestic violence call, were weapons
seized? ()YES (X)NO (Describe)	Was defendant arrested? () YES (X) NO
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
(/h) mb]-:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	22
6. (A) The plaintiff and defendant are 18 y	-
	ivorced, OR
2. ()present household members ()fe	ormer household members; OR
(B) The defendant is 18 years old or old	er or emancipated AND
1. plaintiff and defendant are ()unmarri	
2. () plaintiff and defendant have had a	
4. I PLATIETE AND DETENDANT NAVE NAD A	
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include	alea manusuma reservit IV
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include	9/99 RESIDES WITH Def
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include	9/99 RESIDES WITH DEF
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7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0	
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0	y (X)previously ()never resided together
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0. 8. The plaintiff and defendant: () presently (X) family relationship NO RELATION & I	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify)
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify)
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0. 8. The plaintiff and defendant: () presently (X) family relationship NO RELATION & I	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify) FICATION************************************
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7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0. 8. The plaintiff and defendant: () presently (X) family relationship NO RELATION & 1	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify) FICATION************************************
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0: 8. The plaintiff and defendant: () presently (X) family relationship NO RELATION & I **********************************	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify) FICATION*********************************** by me are true. I am aware that if any illfully false I am subject to punishment
7. Where appropriate, list children (Include MORETZ ALAYNA S F 06/0. 8. The plaintiff and defendant: () presently (X) family relationship NO RELATION & I **********************************	y (X)previously ()never resided together NO RELATION (Specify) FICATION************************************

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINT/TRO INCIDENT/HISTORY DESCRIPTION

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COMPLAINT/TRO INCIDENT /HISTORY DESCRIPTION

New Jersey Domestic Violence Civil Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order FV-03-876-12x

The undersigned complains that said defendant did endanger plaintiff's life, health or well being (give specific facts regarding acts or threats of abuse and the date(s) and time(s)they occurred; specify any weapons); continued from page 1

PRIOR HISTORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

9/1/11 DEF TOLD PLA "DON'T FUCK WITH ME, I'LL BURY YOU". DEFT SENDS PLA TEXT MESSAGES THAT ARE DEGRADING AND ABUSIVE.

IN THE PAST, DEFT HAS PUNCHED, SLAPPED, SPIT, PULLED HAIR AND THROWN THINGS AT PLA. DEFT HAS THREATENED TO SLICE PLA THROAT. DEFT HAS SAID HE WILL KILL PLA MANY TIMES.

9/26/11 DEF GRABBED PLA ARM AND TWISTED IT.

9/1/11 DEF TOLD PLA "YOU'RE GONNA WISH YOU HAD COMMITED SUICIDE".

1 YEAR AGO, DEFT STUCK A PEN IN PLA OPEN CUT.

DEFT HAS PUNCHED PLA IN HER ARMS AND LEGS.

DEFT HAS TRAPPED PLA IN A CORNER.

DEFT HAS TOLD PLA THAT HE KNOWS PEOPLE WHO CAN TAKE CARE OF THINGS AND NOONE WOULD KNOW.

4/10 DEFT CHASED PLA INTO THE HOUSE LIKE HE WAS GOING TO KILL HER. PLA SLAMMED DOOR AND TRIED TO LOCK IT, DEFT BUSTED THRU THE DOOR. THE DOOR HIT PLA ARM LEAVING A SCRATCH

Serve this document on the defendant as part of the Complaint/TRO

N.J. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL COMPLAINT AND (VXO () AMENDED TRO PAGE 2 of 5 Docket No.FV-03-000876-12 Defendant's Name MOK , KENNETH C

* PART I - RELIEF - Instructions: Relief sought by plaintiff * TRO FRO GRANTED DEFENDANT:
* 1. ()N/A () You are prohibited from returning to the scene of violence * 2. (X)(X) You are prohibited from future acts of domestic violence * 3. (X)(X) You are barred from the following locations:
* (X) RESIDENCES OF PLAINTIFF (X) PLACE(S) OF EMPLOYMENT OF PLAINTIF * (X) OTHER(S) (LIST ONLY ADDRESSES KNOWN TO DEFENDANT): 10 WYDHAM RD VOORHEES NJ
* 4. You are prohibited from having any oral, written, personal, * (X)(X) (X) electronic or other form of contact with: PLAINTIFF * ()()() () OTHER(S) *
*
* 5. You are prohibited from making or causing anyone else to * (X)(X)(X) make harassing communications to: PLAINTIFF * ()()() OTHER(S) - SAME AS #4 ABOVE OR LIST NAMES
*
*
* 6. You are prohibited from stalking, following or threatening * (X)(X) You are prohibited from stalking, following or threatening * (X)(X) You are prohibited from stalking, following or threatening
* () () OTHER(S) - SAME AS #4 ABOVE OR LIST NAMES *
* 7. You must pay emergent monetary relief to (describe amnt & method) * ()() () PLAINTIFF
* ()() () DEPENDANT(S)
* 8. ()() You must be subject to intake monitoring of conditions/restraints
* ()() () Other: (evaluations or treatments, describe) *
* 9. ()() () Psychiatric evaluation:
* 10.(X)(X) PROHIBITION AGAINST POSSESSION OF WEAPONS: You are prohibited * from possessing any and all firearms or other weapons and must
* immediately surrender these firearms, weapons, permit(s) to
* carry, application(s) to purchase firearms and firearms
* purchaser ID card to the officer serving this Court Order.
<pre>* Failure to do so will result in your arrest and incarceration. * Other weapon(s)MAYNOT POSSESS ********************************</pre>

* PLAINTIFF:
* 11.()() () You are granted exclusive possession of (list residence or alternate housing only if specifically known to defendant):
* 12.()() () You are granted temporary custody of:
*
* 13.()() () Oth Relief Pla:
* ()()() " " Children:

* LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER:
* You are to accompany to scene, residence, shared place of business, other
* (indicate address, time, duration and purpose):
* ()() () Plaintiff
*
* ()() Defendant



N.J. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CITTL COMPLAINT AND () TRO () AMENDED TRO PAGE 3 of 5
Docket No.FV-03-000876-1. Defendent's Name MOR :, KENNETH C
\cdot
* WARRANT TO SEARCH FOR AND TO SEIZE WEAPONS FOR SAFEKEEPING
*() TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER HAVING JURISDICTION: This Order shall serve as
* a warrant to search for and seize any issued permit to carry a firearm,
* application to purchase a firearm and firearms purchaser identification card
* issued to the defendant and the following firearm(s) or other weapon(s):
to the second day and the second flow the second se
* 1.You are hereby commanded to search for the above described weapons and/or * permits to carry a firearm, application to purchase a firearm and firearms
parameter of the control of the cont
* 2. You are hereby ordered in the event you seize any of the weapons described
 above, to give a receipt for the property seized to the person from whom they were taken or in whose possession they were found, or in the absence of
* such a person to have a copy of this Order together with such receipt in or * upon the said structure from which the property was taken.
apoil bits bala sound aron miles the proportif was salient
* 3. You are authorized to execute this order immediately or as soon thereafter * as is practicable: ()Apptime: ()Other.
as is proceeded () in the constant
* 4. You are further ordered after the execution of this Order, to promptly provide the Court with a written inventory of the property seized per this Order.
* the court with a written inventory of the property seized per this order. ***********************************
PART II - RELIEF - DEFENDANT:
1. ()() () No parenting time/visitation until further ordered; ()() () Parenting time pursuant to
()() () Parenting time/visitation permitted as follows:
()() () Farencing cime/visitation permitted as forlows:
2. ()() () Risk assessment ordered (by whom/any requirements/return dates):
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3. You must provide compensation as follows:
()() () Emergent support for plaintiff:
()() For dependent(s):
N/A() () Ongoing support for plaintiff:
N/A() () For dependent(s):
()() Compensatory damages for plaintiff:
N/A() () Punitive damages to plaintiff:
N/A() () To Third Party(ies) (describe):
()() Medical coverage for plaintiff:
()() () For Dependent(s): ()() () Rent () Mortgage payments (specify amount(s) and recipient(s))
()()()Rent ()Mortgage payments (specify amount(s) and recipient(s))
4. ()() You must participate in a batterers intervention program:
5. ()() You are granted temporary possession of personal property (describe):
PART II - RELIEF - PLAINTIFF:
1. ()() You are granted temporary possession of personal property (describe):
COMMENTS: CROSS COMPLAINT PENDING UNDER FV-03-864-12 SCHEDULED FOR 12/14/11.
•
FD-03-485-09 SCHEDULED FOR MEDIATION 1-24-12. DEFT HAS PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL CUSTODY UNDER FD-03-485-09. DEF HAS BEEN AWARDED TEMP
CUSTODY UNDER TRO FV-03-864-12

A violation of any section of this Order by defendant may result in arrest and incarcaration. Only a Court can change this Order.

NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT ORDER ID:DV-10001FL2P (Rev 0901)



N.J. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL COMPLAINT AND ()TRO ()AMENDED TRO PAGE 4 of S Docket No.FV-03-000876-1: Defendant's Name MOE ;, KENNETH C
() TRO DENIED. Complaint dismissed by Family Part.
() TRO DENIED by Municipal Court, forwarded to Family Part for administrative dismissal, and plaintiff advised of right to file new Complaint in Superior Court, Family Division.
TRO GRANTED: The Court has established jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq., and has found sufficient grounds and exigent circumstances that an immediate danger of domestic violence exists and that an emergency restraining Order is necessary pursuant to R.5:7A(b) and N.J.S.A.2C:25-28 to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of domestic violence and to search for and seize firearms and other weapons as indicated in this Order.
ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WILL SERVE AND FULLY ENFORCE THIS ORDER. This ex parte Domestic Violence Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order meets the criteria of the federal Violence Against Women Act for enforcement outside of the State of New Jersey upon verification of service of defendant. 18U.S.C.A 2265 & 2266.
* THIS ORDER SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER ACTION OF THE COURT AND SERVICE OF SAID ORDER ON THE DEFENDANT. 3'.+)
1. Both the plaintiff and defendant are ordered to appear for a final hearing on (date) 12/14/2011 at (time) 08:45 A.M at the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, located at (address) 4TH FLOOR, COURTROOM 4C
49 RANCOCAS ROAD
MT HOLLY, NJ 08060-
NOTE: You must bring financial information including pay stubs, insurance information, bills & mortgage receipts with you to court.
2. () The final hearing in this matter shall not be scheduled until:
3. () Interpreter needed. Language:
Upon satisfaction of the above-noted conditions notify the Court immediately so that a final hearing date may be set.

IMPORTANT: The parties cannot themselves change the terms of this Order on their own. This Order may only be changed or dismissed by the Superior Court. The named defendant cannot have any contact with the plaintiff without permission of the Court.

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT:

A violation of any of the provisions listed in this Order or failure to comply with the directive to surrender all weapons, firearm permits, applications or identification cards may constitute criminal contempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b) and may also constitute violations of other state and federal laws which may result in your arrest and/or criminal prosecution. This may result in a jail sentence.

You have the right to immediately file an appeal of this temporary Order before the Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part, as indicated above, and a hearing may be scheduled.

Docket No. FV-03-000876-12	T /	MOK ;, KENNETH C
	RETURN OF SERVICE	
1/		
(V) Plaintiff was given a copy	of this Complaint/TRO by:	$\Omega = \Omega = \Omega$
M. Din	2.4Dm. 19/0/11	Yamila Halanus #4n)
1011	J. [VIII 17]	SIGNATURE/BADGE #/DEPT
PRINT NAME	TIME & DATE	SIGNATURE/BAUGE #/DEPI
()I hereby certify that I ser defendant personally:	ved the within Complaint/	TRO by delivering a copy to
PRINT NAME	TIME & DATE	SIGNATURE/BADGE #/DEPT
()I hereby certify that I ser substituted service as follo		
PRINT NAME	TIME & DATE	SIGNATURE/BADGE #/DEPT
()Defendant could not be serve	ed. Explain:	<u> </u>
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
PRINT NAME	TIME & DATE	SIGNATURE/BADGE #/DEPT
	-	·
DEFENDANT MUST SIGN THIS STA	ATEMENT: I hereby acknowl	edge the receipt of the
restraining Order. I understand		
any contact with the named plas	intiff even if the plaint	iff agrees to the contact or
invites me into the premises an	nd that I may be arrested	and prosecuted if I violate
this Order.		
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
GEOVERNING OF DEPENDANCE	TIME C DATE	

^{*}THE COURTHOUSE IS ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WITH DISABILITIES. PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT IF YOU REQUIRE ASSISTANCE.



	Debr	PLAINTIFF: CHANCERY DIVISION - FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. FV- 03-876-	/
	Kenn	ORDER OF DISMISSAL TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OF FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER	R
THE		considered the testimony and/or certification at this hearing and the Court having determined that	-
	1. The	Plaintiff having requested dismissal of the matter, and	•
	. [Having read "What Dissolving a Restraining Order Means", (attached)	•
	Ε	Having read and signed "Certification for Dissolution/Modification of Order, (attached)	-
	[Having not been coerced or placed under duress to withdraw the complaint and dissolve the Order,	
	Ε	Having been advised of the cycle of domestic violence, and of the protective resources available flurough the Court and the local domestic violence program(s), especially with regard to housing and Court-ordered emergency custody and support;	ŧ
-	. E	Understanding that withdrawel of the complaint and dismissal of the Restraining Onler will eliminate the protection that had been issued under this Order,	
	[
	. 2. The	Plaintiff failing to appear for Final Hearing, and	
		The Court having been unable to contact the plaintiff via telephone numbers/address given; OR	
-	. [The Court having determined that plaintiff was contacted and that coercion or duress did not cause the plaintiff's non-appearance, OR	
	3.	Court having determined on appeal of the Temporary Restraining Order that the required burden of proof for a Final Restraining Order has not been met, OR	•
	4_ [The Court having determined upon the appearance of both parties that the plaintiff's allegation of domestic violence has not been substantiated.	
	uce Complaint, dat	BY ORDERED on this	:C
	IT IS FURI	HER ORDERED THAT:	
	The compliant to	is dismissed and present support order under this docket is terminated and any arrears are ☐ vacated ☐ preserv [appropriate party(ies)]. Probation to terminate interest and close case	ed =
	The complaint transferred or paid die		•
×	Other:	ismissed by the gount,	
	·	RETURN OF SERVICE.	-
to de	Plainfiff was s	iven a copy of the Order by	
1	The face of mark and	signal a count of the Order by	-

Date:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

AOC (Revised 6/00)

Filed with the Court

OCT 25 2011

•		
	Novak,)	Superior Court Of New Jersey Kenneth S. Domaskit, 18.C. Chancery Division - Family Part
	Plaintiff,)	Burlington County
	v.)	Civil Action
•	Moretz }	Docket No: <u>FD-03-485-09</u>
	Defendant.	ORDER FOR BY CONSENT
	Deleunaur.	RETURNABLE: 10-25
	This Matter being presented to	the Court, Plaintiff represented by self-represented
	Esq. and Defendant represented by	Dilla Nussey, Esq., and the court having
	reviewed all pleadings filed, considered	the arguments of counsel and set forth its findings of fact
•	and conclusions of law upon the record	which are incorporated herein, and for other good cause
•	shown:	
3,1	It Is On This day of	2011, Ordered That:
	(1) The parties shall	share joint legal custody
	of their more day	ynter, Alayna Murctz, dob, 6-9-99;
	@ Father shall be to	he parent of primary residence:
	@ Mother and Alayno	to others consisting through
		of the child's healthcar plan
	with New Trisey Farmit	The Father is seeking reinstatement
	of policy as of 10/3	5/11/Counciling to address parenting time for Moth
	- Paris Engl	only communicate via
٠	email; or text;	
•	(5) tainer to have ext	SIR possession of
	38 taybrooke Drive	Marthan, New Truscy 08053
-	(e) In next	Marther, New Truscy 08053; Mother to notify father's
=	attorney of a date of	a time she will called had
	Delongings Each party	to have third property
	LIV THINK Shall not	seet child support from
	LA DA	Quia.
í	DAI VM'	

Jour populations of RE: Nanx v. Moratz DOCKET#: FO-03-485-09 (Continuation/Addendum of Order): Mother at this pending courseling having a level of comfort with Mother Schriff Novak 10-25-11 TERRENCE R. COOK, J.S.C.

A.3021-1173



New Jersey Judiciary Superior Court - Appellate Division NOTICE OF APPEAL

	Type or clearly print all information. Attach additional sheets in	necessary.	ATTORNEY / LAW FIRM / PRO SE LITIGANT (2)								
	TITLE IN FULL (AS CAPTIONED BELOW): (1)		NAME								
•	Debra Novak v. Kenneth Moretz		Ronald G. Lieberman, Esquire, Adinolfi & Lieberman, P.A.								
		STREET ADDRESS 4 Kings Highway East									
			CITY	STATE	ZIP	PHONE NUMBER					
			Haddonfield EMAIL ADDRESS	NJ	08033	856-428-8334					
		•	rlieberman@sjfar	milylawy	ers.com						
	ON APPEAL FROM										
	TRIAL COURT JUDGE (3)	1	OR STATE AGENCY (4)	*	1	TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY NUMBER (5					
	Marie White Bell, J.S.C.	Superior Co	urt Family Part Bu	rlington (County	FV-03-876-12					
-	Notice is hereby given that (6) Debra?	Novak			_ appe	eals to the Appellate					
(7)	Division from a □Judgment or ■ O	rder entere	on December 22	2, 2011		in the □Civil					
	☐ Criminal or ■ Family Part of the S	☐ Criminal or Family Part of the Superior Court or from a ☐ State Agency decision entered on									
					,						
10)	16 and annually at the cutton to the										
(8)	If not appealing the entire judgment, order or agency decision, specify what parts or paragraphs are										
	being appealed.										
			•								
•					•						
ļ			-	Ξ							
(9)	Have all issues, as to all parties in this	action, bef	ore the trial cou	rt or ag	ency be	een disposed of? (In					
	consolidated actions, all issues as to a										
-	· ·			•		-p					
	If not, has the order been properly cer	tified as fina	al pursuant to <u>R</u> .	<u>.</u> 4:42-2	? 🗆	Yes ☐ No					
<u> </u>	For criminal, quasi-criminal and juveni	la actions o	nlu:								
			•								
(10A)	Give a concise statement of the offe	ense and th	e judgment inclu	uding da	ate ente	ered and any sentence					
	or disposition imposed:										
(400)						•					
(10B)	This appeal is from a conviction			□pos	st-convi	ction relief.					
	If post-conviction relief, is it the	1st ☐ 2nd	other		pecify						
(10C)	Is defendant incarcerated? Yes	s □ No	-	ə ₁	peony	D					
` 1	Was bail granted or the sentence or		ntovod3 CLV	′ D	Ma	APPELLATED					
	was ball granted or the sentence of	uisposition	stayed? Y	es 🗌	140	- INVISION					
(10D)	If in custody, name the place of conf	inement:				FEB 2 3040					
	•		-			- 2012					
	Defendant				•	Alla					
	Defendant was represented below b	•				View					
-	☐ Public Defender ☐ self ☐ private	counsel_	 		******						
ſ		specify									

(11)	following:	·	liave beelf serve	за мнеге аррг	icable OU tue
			Name	Date	of Service
·.· ·	Trial Court Judge	Marie White Bell, J.	S.C.	Febr	uary 22, 2012
	Trial Court Division Manager	Barbara Sopronyi	-		uary 22, 2012
÷	Tax Court Administrator				
	State Agency				-
-	Attorney General or Attorney for		•		•
	Governmental body pursuant R. 2:5-1(a), (e) or (h)	t to	•		
	Other parties in this action:	•	•		
_		***			
•	Name and Designation Kenneth Moretz, Plaintiff/Defendant	Attorney Name, Addres D. Ryan Nussey, 38 Haddon (856) 428-7469			Date of Service February 22, 2012
٠.	·		_		
			· •		•
(12)	Attached transcript request form h	nas been served where ap	plicable on the f	ollowina:	
			Name	Date of	Amount of
•			Tu, Tu	Service	Deposit
	Trial Court Transcript Office	Diana Doman Transcribing		2/2/2012	· \$500
-	Court Reporter (if applicable)				
	Supervisor of Court Reporters	•			
	Clerk of the Tax Court				
	State Agency	•			
(4.2)	Cumpt from authoriting the trans-				•
(13)		inperequest form due to tr	ne following:	•	
	☐ No verbatim record.			•	
	☐ Transcript in possession of a mitted along with an electror List the date(s) of the trial or	nic copy).	four copies of th	e transcript m	ust be sub-
	. Motion for abbroviation of tre	progrint filed with the security			·
	☐ Motion for abbreviation of tra			w. Attach cop	y.
	☐ Motion for free transcript filed	a with the court below. Att	ach copy.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·
	I certify that the foregoing states	ments are true to the be	st of my knowl	edge, inform	ation and belief.
	I also certify that, unless exemp	t, the filing fee required	by <u>N.J.S.A.</u> 22	A:2 has bee	n paid.
	. -		·		
	(14) February 22, 2012	(15) MO	laac		•
	DATE		OF ATTORNEY OF	R PRO SE LITIGA	ANT

A-3021-11T3



Revised: 01/03/2011, CN: 10500 (Appellate Civil CIS)

()

New Jersey Judiciary Superior Court - Appellate Division CIVIL CASE INFORMATION STATEMENT

Please type or clearly print all information.						
TITLE IN FULL (1)		TRIAL COU	RT OR AGE	NCY DOCKET I	NUMBER (2)	
Debra Novak v. Kenneth Moretz		FV-03-87	76-12	•	•	
	•	_	. •		•	
Attach additional sheets as necessary for any information below.						
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY EMAIL ADDRESS: rlieberman@sjf	amilylawyers.com	1				
PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT OTHER (SPECIFY)				· .	·	
NAME Ronald Lieberman, Esquire		CLIENT Debra No	vak			
STREET ADDRESS 4 Kings Highway East	CITY Haddonfield	STATE NJ	ZIP 08033	TELEPHON 856-428-	ENUMBER 8334	
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY	erandnussey.com			-		
NAME D. Ryan Nussey, Esquire		CLIENT Kenneth	Moretz	_		
STREET ADDRESS 38 Haddon Avenue	CITY Haddonfield	STATE NJ	,	TELEPHON 856-428-	ENUMBER 7469	
Indicate which parties, if any, did not participate below or were no longer	N			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	hoing annual	
Are there any claims against any party below, either in this or a con	solidated action, wh	ich have not b	een dispos	ed		
Are there any claims against any party below, either in this or a con of, including counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims and app	solidated action, whi dications for counse	ich nave not b il fees?	een alspos	eo	YES	■ NO
If so, has the order been properly certified as final pursuant to \underline{R} . 4:	42-2? (If not, leave t	io appeal must	be sought	. <u>R</u> . 2:2-4,2:5-	6) 🗌 YES	□ NO
(If the order has been certified, attach, together with a copy of relevant pleadings and a brief explanation as to why the order	the order, a copy of qualified for certifica	the complaint ation pursuant	or any othe to <u>R</u> . 4:42-2	er 2.)		
Were any claims dismissed without prejudice?	-				:YES	■ NO
f so, explain and indicate any agreement between the parties conc	eming future disposi	ition of those c	laims.			
	-					
					:	
Is the validity of a statute, regulation, executive order, franchise or $(\underline{R}.\ 2.5-1(h))$	constitutional provision	on of this State	e being que	estioned?	☐ YES	₩ NO
GIVE A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL	HISTORY:				•	
See Attached Sheet		_	APPELL	FILED ATE DIVISIO 2012	SÀI	
		,	FEB 2	2010	••	•
				2012		

(9)	(9) TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, LIST THE PROPOSED ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON THE APPEAL AS THEY WILL BE DESC APPROPRIATE POINT HEADINGS PURSUANT TO R. 2:6-2(a)(5). (Appellant or cross-appellant only.):	RIBEDIN
	Whether the trial court erred in denying a final restraining order in favor of Debra Novak against Kenneth More 22, 2011.	etz on December
]		
1		• <u>-</u>
(10)	10) IF YOU ARE APPEALING FROM A JUDGMENT ENTERED BY A TRIAL JUDGE SITTING WITHOUT A JURY OR FROM ATTRIAL COURT, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:	NORDER OF THE
-	1. Did the trial judge issue oral findings or an opinion? If so, on what date? 12/22/2011	□ NO
Î	2. Did the trial judge issue written findings or an opinion? If so, on what date? TES	■ NO
	3. Will the trial judge be filing a statement or an opinion pursuant to R. 2:5-1(b)?	■ NO
	Caution: Before you indicate that there was neither findings nor an opinion, you should inquire of the trial judge to determine an opinion was placed on the record out of counsel's presence or whether the judge will be filing a statement or opinion purs	e whether findings or suant to <u>R.</u> 2:5-1(b).
	DATE OF YOUR INQUIRY: 2/2/2012	
	1. IS THERE ANY APPEAL NOW PENDING OR ABOUT TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT WHICH:	
(11)	(A) Arises from substantially the same case or controversy as this appeal?	NO NO
(12)		■ NO
(13)	2. WAS THERE ANY PRIOR APPEAL INVOLVING THIS CASE OR CONTROVERSY?	NO .
(1 <u>4</u>)	14) IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 2 ABOVE IS YES, STATE: Appellate Division Decket Number	•
1	Case Name: Appellate Division Docket Number	ACC
ì.		•
		•
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		· · ·
	Civil appeals are screened for submission to the Civil Appeals Settlement Program (CASP) to determine their potential for alternative, a simplification of the issues and any other matters that may aid in the disposition or handling of the appeal. Plushen responding to the following question. A negative response will not necessarily rule out the scheduling of a preargument.	ease consider these
(15)	alternative, a simplification of the issues and any other matters that may aid in the disposition or handling of the appeal. Please when responding to the following question. A negative response will not necessarily rule out the scheduling of a preargument. State whether you think this case may benefit from a CASP conference.	lease consider these ent conference.
(15)	alternative, a simplification of the issues and any other matters that may aid in the disposition or handling of the appeal. Pleather responding to the following question. A negative response will not necessarily rule out the scheduling of a preargument State whether you think this case may benefit from a CASP conference. [] YES Explain your answer:	lease consider these ent conference.
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Revised: 01/03/2011, CN: 10500 (Appellate Civil CIS)

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Temporary Restraining Order under Docket Number FV-03-876-12 against Mr. Moretz and denying the request of Ms. Novak for the entry of a Final Restraining Order against Mr. Moretz when Ms. Novak was not permitted to fully testify in prosecution of her demand for the entry of a final restraining order, the Trial Court did not address whether an act of domestic violence had been committed against Ms. Novak by Mr. Moretz, and there was no judicial consideration or review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the temporary restraining order in favor of Ms. Novak.

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On December 7, 2011, Plaintiff, Kenneth Moretz, filed a Domestic Violence Complaint against Defendant, Debra Novak, under Docket Number FV-03-864-12 and a Temporary Restraining Order was entered against her on that date. He alleged both harassment and assault.

On December 8, 2011, Ms. Novak filed a Domestic Violence Complaint against Mr. Moretz under Docket Number FV-03-876-12 and a Temporary Restraining Order was entered against him on that date. She alleged assault.

A hearing was held before the Honorable Marie White Bell, J.S.C. (on recall) in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, on December 22, 2011 that consolidated both Temporary Restraining Orders.

Following that consolidated hearing, Judge Bell entered two Orders dated December 22, 2011. The first Order issued a final restraining order against Ms. Novak (FV-03-864-12) and the other Order dismissed the temporary restraining order against Mr. Moretz (FV-03-876-12).

It is from the Orders dated December 22, 2011, entered by Judge Bell that Ms. Novak appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties had a dating relationship commencing in or about 1999 and have a daughter in common, Alayna Moretz, now age 12.

The parties resided together with their daughter for almost that entire time period but never married.

Prior temporary restraining orders between the parties were dismissed and the parties would then resume their relationship until they finally ended their relationship and separated.

Custody and parenting time matters were defined by way of a consent order dated October 3, 2011, filed under Docket Number FD-03-485-09.

On December 7, 2011, Mr. Moretz filed a Domestic Violence Complaint against Ms. Novak, alleging harassment and assault. He alleged that she was at his residence, peered through a window, and punched and smacked him.

On December 8, 2011, Ms. Novak filed a Domestic Violence Complaint against Mr. Moretz, alleging assault. She alleged that he accused her of stealing a phone and they argued. She and he then left in separate vehicles but followed each other and after driving a distance, the two parties pulled their vehicles into a parking lot where the parties continued their argument. After further argument, Mr. Moretz then entered his truck and pulled away while Ms. Novak was standing on the edge of his truck, causing her to hit his side mirror and fall off his truck.

The hearing on cross-complaints was held on December 22,

2011, before the Honorable Marie White Bell, J.S.C. Following the hearing held on that day, Judge Bell entered two Orders. One Order issued a Final Restraining Order against Ms. Novak (FV-03-864-12) and the other Order dismissed the Temporary Restraining Order against Mr. Moretz (FV-03-876-12).

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It is from the Order dated December 22, 2011, entered by Judge Bell that Ms. Novak appeals.

BRIEF EXPLANATION AS TO WHY THE ORDERS QUALIFIED FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO R. 4:42-2

The Court's Orders dated December 22, 2011, acted to determine the issues of cross final restraining orders. Such rulings were the cornerstones of claims raised by Mr. Moretz against Ms. Novak and by Ms. Novak against Mr. Moretz.

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So, both Orders, from which Ms. Novak takes this appeal, constitute final dispositions of her requests for the issuance of a final restraining order against Mr. Moretz and for a dismissal of the temporary restraining order against her.