2nd Circuit: loss of liberty implicit in civil commitment matters implicates due process protections

In Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit considered the claim of a class of current or former patients in New York State mental hospitals that the voluntary, involuntary, and emergency civil commitment standards and procedures in N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 9.13, 9.27, and 9.39 were unconstitutional under the federal due process standard.  Although the statute in place at the time provided for a right to counsel, appellants claimed that it “unconstitutionally require[d] the Mental Health Information Service (MHIS) to be both counsel for the patient and independent investigator for the court (adequacy of counsel claim)[.]” Id. at 963.

After noting that “[i]nvoluntary civil commitment to a mental institution has been recognized as ‘a massive curtailment of liberty'” “requir[ing] due process protections” Id. at 971 (citing e.g., Vivtek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 [1980]; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 [1979]), the court held that the New York law in question fulfilled that mandate, because it specifically provided for a right to counsel “in any judicial proceeding concerning a patient’s commitment, retention or status, and throughout any appeal concerning objection to medication… That MHIS may also serve this function does not undermine the statute’s facial validity.” Id. at 976.  The court’s willingness to engage in a due process analysis of the mental health commitment procedures suggests a recognition that the right is rooted in the Fourteenth’s guarantee of due process “where an individual’s physical liberty is threatened by the state’s action.” Id. (internal citations omitted).