Alabama appellate court reverses TPR where appointed counsel denied continuance

In J.Q. v. Calhoun County Dept of Human Res., 2025 WL 1774932 (Ala. App. 2025), a trial court held that a parent who requested appointed counsel on the first day of trial regarding termination of parental rights was not entitled to a continuance so that the appointed attorney could prepare for trial.  The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed, pointing to the seriousness of termination of parental rights and the fact that the trial court could have appointed the same attorney the parent had in the dependency phase so that the appointed attorney would be familiar with the case, but the trial court had not done so.  While recognizing the importance of expediency in child welfare matters, it cautioned against undermining parental rights:

Our legislature has indicated that termination-of-parental-rights proceedings should be resolved expeditiously so that dependent children can receive permanency. However, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality, and and “permanency for a dependent child cannot be achieved through the sacrifice of a parent’s right to effective assistance of counsel in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out the trial court knew the parent was indigent (by virtue of the fact that he had appointed counsel earlier in the case) yet required him to re-prove his indigence, commenting that “[W]e find it unduly burdensome and overly technical to require a parent to repeatedly request the appointment of counsel when he or she has previously requested counsel and has already proven his or her entitlement to such counsel.