Delinquency right to counsel extends to related DYRS matters
The D.C. Court of Appeals extended the right to counsel for delinquent children in proceedings outside the delinquency court. In re N.H.M., 224 A.3d 581 (D.C. 2020). The question was whether the statutory right to counsel for children in delinquency proceedings under D.C.’s Criminal Justice Act (CJA) extends to situations where a judge commits the delinquent child to the custody of the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), and the DYRS has subsequent administrative proceedings (although the delinquency court retains jurisdiction).
In In re N.H.M., the delinquency judge appointed a lawyer for the child in the DYRS proceedings but told the appointed lawyer that she would not be compensated under the CJA for the DYRS proceedings since the CJA did not extend that far. The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the CJA right to counsel extends to delinquency and “ancillary” proceedings, and held that the DYRS proceedings were “ancillary” under the definition of the CJA. Id. at 587-88.
The court also rejected the government’s argument that this situation was analogous to postconviction proceedings (where adult prisoners lack a right to counsel):
An important distinction between the adult and juvenile system developed in furtherance of these goals is that the court maintains jurisdiction over the child’s case for the entirety of their commitment, D.C. Code § 16-2303, to ensure they are “receiving appropriate services” and are in the appropriate “level of placement,” D.C. Code § 16-2323(h).
Id. at 589.