MN Supreme Court expands RTC in civil commitment proceedings

10/10/2025 , Minnesota , Litigation , Civil Commitment

The Minnesota Supreme Court held that where an attorney appointed to represent a respondent in a civil commitment proceeding brought an extraordinary writ to compel the State to timely transfer the respondent from a jail to a mental health facility, such writ was a “proceeding under” the civil commitment code, meaning the attorney was entitled to compensation pursuant to the civil commitment statute’s payment provisions.  In the case, the district court had ordered the respondent to be transferred to the mental health facility, and because he was in jail he qualified for priority admission to a state-operated program within 48 hours.  However, a month later the transfer had still not occurred, so his court-appointed counsel filed a writ of mandamus and habeas corpus to compel the transfer.  The district court granted the writ and ordered the transfer, which then occurred, but the County refused to pay for the attorney’s work on the writs, arguing it did not fit within the “any proceeding under this chapter” language within the civil commitment statute.  But the Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the legislature intended the phrase to be broad by using the words “any proceedings” and that in other places the term “proceeding” was used to cover matters that might not ordinarily be considered a proceeding (such as a pre-hearing examination).  The Court further held that “It is difficult to see how a proceeding brought by appointed counsel to enforce this right provided under chapter 253B would not be a proceeding under chapter 253B”, and that a proceeding “under” the chapter was not the same as a proceeding “named” in the chapter.  While the Court expressed sympathy for the potential financial impact of its decision, it concluded that “[w]e will not infer a legislative intent contrary to that expressed by the unambiguous language of a statute.”

 

Appointment of Counsel: Yes
Qualified: Yes
? If "yes", the established right to counsel or discretionary appointment of counsel is limited in some way, including any of: the only authority is a lower/intermediate court decision or a city council, not a high court or state legislature; there has been a subsequent case that has cast doubt; a statute is ambiguous; or the right or discretionary appointment is not for all types of individuals or proceedings within that category.