Presumptive right to counsel – Guardianship context

A district court in Georgia held that depriving patients who are committed “voluntarily” by their guardian of the opportunity to challenge their confinement violates due process. In Heichelbech v. Evans, the Middle District of Georgia considered a challenge to the State of Georgia’s policy of not permitting patients with legal guardians to be “discharged or afforded an involuntary commitment proceeding without the consent of [their] legal guardian.” 798 F.Supp. 708, 711 (M.D. Ga. 1992). The practice was based upon the State’s interpretation of a statute permitting voluntary patients to request their own discharge in writing. Id. The court held that Georgia’s policy “deprived [Plaintiff] of a liberty interest created by state law” in violation of due process, essentially finding that patients admitted by their guardians are entitled to the right to challenge their confinement.

However, the court rejected the Plaintiff’s “conten[tion] that defendants violated his rights to equal protection by distinguishing between voluntary patients with legal guardians and those without in its discharge procedure.” Id. at 714. In disagreeing, the court reasoned that the state had a rational basis in distinguishing between these groups: “Because of the special nature of the relationship between a guardian and his ward and the legal problems unique to that relationship, defendants have a rational basis for treating voluntary patients with guardians differently from those without.” Id. at 15.

Nevertheless, because the court held that patients admitted by a guardian have the right to challenge their confinement through requesting discharge under Ga. Code Ann. § 37-3-22, they presumably also have the right to counsel that attaches in such proceedings. To learn more about the statutory right to counsel afforded to individuals in civil commitment matters, including in matters related to contested discharge requests by voluntary patients, see Georgia, Legislation, Civil Commitment.

Although the court acknowledged that Plaintiff’s initial commitment was not “voluntary”, Id. at 712, the decision stopped short of providing proposed patients with guardians the right to challenge their initial commitments:

The initial admission of plaintiff to the Hospital is not being challenged… Since this case only involves a challenge to the process provided when an incapacitated adult requests a release, Parham by the Supreme Court’s own language, is inapplicable.

Heichelbech, 798 F.Supp. at 713-14 [referring to Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), a case the state argued was analogous but which the court found distinguishable since Parham only “applies to procedures for the initial admission of minors”)]. Accordingly, the holding appears limited to contested discharge requests, so the right to counsel is classified as “qualified.”