Right to counsel
While a state may have many statutes, court decisions, or court rules governing appointment of counsel for a particular subject area, a "Key Development" is a statute/decision/rule that prevails over the others (example: a state high court decision finding a categorical right to counsel in guardianships cases takes precedence over a statute saying appointment in guardianship cases is discretionary).
Litigation, Civil Commitment
In F. J. v. State, 411 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. App. 1980), which involved the right to counsel in civil commitment cases, the court quoted the language from Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980)(regarding due process right to counsel for inmate transferred to mental health facility) about the requirement of “[a]vailability of legal counsel, furnished by the state, if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own”, even though Vitek's holding about counsel did not receive a majority of votes (the 5th vote recognized the need for a "qualified representative", but not necessarily counsel). In In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1119, 1987 Ind. App. LEXIS 2786, *5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), the court cited to F.J. as evidence that “it is a defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases which triggers the right to appointed counsel. To meet due process requirements, therefore, appointed counsel has been required in certain circumstances, regardless of whether the action is labeled criminal or civil.”
Then, in GPH v. Giles, 578 N.E.2d 729 (Ind. App. 1991), the court held that there was no due process right to appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing for a temporary commitment. In explaining this, the court stated:
We deal with whether the trial court violated GPH's constitutional right to assistance of counsel when the court allowed GPH to appear at the preliminary hearing to determine probable cause without counsel … In deciding whether the emergency detention statute unconstitutionally denies GPH of his right to assistance of counsel, we must determine whether a state, in carrying out its parens patriae role, may limit a mental patient's constitutional rights … The state, in exercising its parens patriae role and for the finite period specified in the emergency detention statute, may limit an alleged mental patient's constitutional right to counsel”.
This language implies that there is such a constitutional right to counsel in the ordinary course.
If "yes", the established right to counsel or discretionary appointment of counsel is limited in some way, including any of: the only authority is a lower/intermediate court decision or a city council, not a high court or state legislature; there has been a subsequent case that has cast doubt; a statute is ambiguous; or the right or discretionary appointment is not for all types of individuals or proceedings within that category.
Appointment of Counsel: categorical Qualified: yes