Right to counsel
While a state may have many statutes, court decisions, or court rules governing appointment of counsel for a particular subject area, a "Key Development" is a statute/decision/rule that prevails over the others (example: a state high court decision finding a categorical right to counsel in guardianships cases takes precedence over a statute saying appointment in guardianship cases is discretionary).
Litigation, Involuntary Medical Treatment (incomplete)
In Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344 (N.Y. 1986), the New York Court of Appeals noted that the patient has a strong liberty interest in controlling his treatment (and thus refusing antipsychotic medication) that cannot be overruled absent a compelling interest, despite the fact that the patient was involuntarily committed. The court concluded that the patient had a right, under the state constitution, to a hearing determining whether his treatment should include the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. The court added that for the hearing, "the patient should be afforded representation by counsel", but it cited to Judiciary Law § 35, making it unclear whether it was relying on a statutory provision at the time that already provided for counsel or was grafting a due process right onto the statute. But see also People ex rel Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 259 (1966) (citing various U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Gideon v. Wainwright, Douglas v. People of State of California, and Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, to hold that "an indigent mental patient, who is committed to an institution, is entitled, in a habeas corpus proceeding (brought to establish his sanity), to the assignment of counsel as a matter of constitutional right"); Matter of Andrea B., 405 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Fam. Ct. 1978) ( in case involving juvenile subject to involuntary commitment, court cites to Stanley as well as Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45 (1932), for holding that "the right to counsel, including assigned counsel for the indigent is a due process right"); In re Rodriguez, 607 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (relying on Stanley to hold that "an alleged incompetent has a fundamental right to representation by counsel . . . in opposing a proceeding for a committeeship" and further noting that "[a] proceeding to declare a person incompetent effectively results in a complete loss of personal liberty and property").
If "yes", the established right to counsel or discretionary appointment of counsel is limited in some way, including any of: the only authority is a lower/intermediate court decision or a city council, not a high court or state legislature; there has been a subsequent case that has cast doubt; a statute is ambiguous; or the right or discretionary appointment is not for all types of individuals or proceedings within that category.
Appointment of Counsel: categorical Qualified: no